User
Write something
The Earnout Neither Side Should Have Accepted
The buyer and seller had spent weeks trying to close a valuation gap. The seller believed the company's recent growth justified a higher price, while the buyer wasn't comfortable paying today for earnings that had yet to materialize. Neither wanted to lose the transaction over a disagreement about the future, so their advisors proposed what seemed like an elegant solution. They would use an earnout. The seller would receive additional consideration if the business reached certain performance targets after closing. The buyer would pay the higher valuation only if the results actually appeared. On paper, it seemed to give both sides exactly what they wanted. The problem was that everyone focused on the amount of the earnout and not enough on how it would be measured. The agreement referenced revenue and profitability targets, but left important questions unresolved. How would unusual expenses be treated? Could the buyer increase staffing or marketing after closing? What happened if an investment reduced short-term profit but strengthened the company long term? Who controlled pricing, and how would revenue from new products be allocated? Those questions seemed manageable while everyone was trying to close. A year later, they weren't. The business had grown, but the buyer had also invested heavily in people, systems, and equipment. The seller believed the earnout had been achieved based on the company's underlying performance. The buyer's calculations showed otherwise. Neither side believed they were being unreasonable. They were simply interpreting an ambiguous agreement in the way that supported their own position. The earnout hadn't resolved their valuation disagreement. It had postponed it. Eventually, attorneys became involved, and a provision designed to save the transaction became one of its most expensive sources of friction. Looking back, both sides realized they had spent more time negotiating the potential payout than defining the rules that would determine whether it was earned.
0
0
The Earnout Neither Side Should Have Accepted
The Deal That Needed Less Equity, Not A Lower Price
For nearly two months, the buyer and seller kept returning to the same disagreement. The buyer believed the asking price was simply too high. The seller believed the company's performance justified every dollar of it. Each conversation ended in roughly the same place, with neither side willing to move enough to close the gap. Eventually, the buyer stepped away from the negotiation and rebuilt the transaction from the ground up. Instead of asking what price he was willing to pay, he modeled exactly what would happen at closing and during the first several years of ownership. That's when he discovered something unexpected. The purchase price wasn't actually the problem. The business could support the valuation, debt service remained reasonable, and the projected returns still worked. What made the transaction uncomfortable was the amount of equity required on day one. Between the down payment, transaction costs, working capital, and reserves, too much cash was leaving the buyer before he had operated the business for a single day. For weeks, he had been negotiating the wrong number. When he returned to the seller, he didn't ask for another price reduction. Instead, he explained the constraint and proposed changing the capital structure. They discussed a larger seller note, a smaller amount of senior debt, and enough working capital remaining in the business to give the new owner room to operate after closing. The seller was receptive because the conversation no longer required him to defend the value of the company. He could still receive the price he believed the business deserved, while the buyer could reduce the amount of equity exposed at closing. The economics finally worked, not because either side surrendered on valuation, but because they stopped treating price as the only variable available to negotiate. That experience changed how the buyer approached future acquisitions. A deal can be fairly priced and still be poorly structured. Purchase price tells you what you're paying for the business, but capital structure determines how much risk you're assuming to own it.
0
0
The Deal That Needed Less Equity, Not A Lower Price
The Buyer Who Talked Too Much
The buyer walked into the seller meeting expecting a difficult conversation. Due diligence had raised several questions, the seller was frustrated by the process, and meaningful distance remained between them on a few important terms. He knew he needed to explain his position carefully, so he came prepared with his analysis, supporting documents, and an answer for almost everything. That preparation quickly became part of the problem. Every time the seller challenged an assumption, the buyer responded with another explanation. When the seller questioned the valuation, he walked through his model. When concerns surfaced about financing, he explained the capital structure. Even when the seller became quiet, the buyer kept talking because he assumed silence meant his argument hadn't been convincing enough. The more he explained, the less productive the meeting became. At one point, the seller leaned back and said he had a lot to think about. Instead of giving him the space to think, the buyer immediately began explaining why the proposed structure could actually benefit both sides. During a break, the buyer's advisor pulled him aside and pointed out what was happening. He wasn't losing the negotiation because his arguments were weak. He was making it impossible to know what the seller actually thought because he never stopped talking long enough to hear it. When they returned, the buyer changed his approach. He answered questions directly, but stopped defending every point. When the seller became quiet, he allowed the silence to remain. When a proposal was presented, he resisted the urge to improve it before the seller had even responded. The seller eventually began filling those silences himself. He explained which terms actually bothered him, which ones he could accept, and why one issue mattered far more than the buyer had realized. Much of that information had been hidden during the first half of the meeting because the buyer had been so focused on explaining his own position that he hadn't created enough room to understand the seller's.
The Buyer Who Talked Too Much
The Seller Who Needed To Be Right
The buyer and seller had spent weeks discussing valuation, and neither side seemed willing to move. The buyer's analysis supported one number. The seller believed the company was worth considerably more. Every attempt to discuss comparable transactions, normalized earnings, or future capital requirements seemed to make the disagreement more personal. Eventually, the buyer realized they weren't really arguing about a multiple. The seller had spent thirty years building the company. He had survived recessions, lost customers, hired employees, made payroll during difficult months, and sacrificed time with his family to keep the business alive. The asking price had become more than a financial number. In his mind, it represented what those thirty years had been worth. Each time the buyer challenged the valuation, the seller heard something different. He heard that the business wasn't as successful as he believed, that his sacrifices weren't worth as much as he thought, and perhaps even that the buyer didn't appreciate what he had built. Once the buyer understood that, he stopped trying to prove the seller wrong. He acknowledged what had been created and made an important distinction: respecting the value of the seller's life's work didn't require ignoring the economics of the acquisition. That opened a different conversation. Instead of forcing the entire disagreement into the purchase price, they began separating what the buyer could confidently pay today from what the seller believed the business could produce tomorrow. Part of the consideration was structured through seller financing, with an additional component tied to future performance. The seller didn't have to admit his valuation was wrong, and the buyer didn't have to pretend the numbers supported something they didn't. Both sides were able to move forward without turning the negotiation into a contest over who had been right. That experience taught the buyer something important about negotiating with founders. Numbers that look purely financial on a spreadsheet can carry decades of emotional meaning for the person sitting across the table.
The Seller Who Needed To Be Right
The Dinner That Saved The Deal
By the sixth week of negotiations, a deal that had started with genuine enthusiasm felt like it was slowly coming apart. The buyer and seller had barely spoken directly in days. Instead, attorneys exchanged redlines, advisors forwarded concerns, and emails grew longer as both sides tried to protect themselves from what they believed the other side might do. Nothing was technically wrong with the transaction, yet almost everything felt wrong with the relationship. A request for additional protection was interpreted as distrust. A delayed response looked like hesitation. Changes in legal language that might have been routine began to feel like attempts to renegotiate issues everyone thought had already been settled. The seller finally called the buyer and suggested something neither advisory team had proposed. They should have dinner. No attorneys. No spreadsheets. No purchase agreement sitting between them. For two hours, they barely discussed specific deal terms. The seller talked about why he was concerned about what would happen to longtime employees and whether customers would experience the transition differently. The buyer explained why several diligence findings had made his lenders more cautious and why certain protections weren't attempts to take advantage of the seller. For the first time in weeks, each understood the motivations behind the other's behavior. The buyer realized that several positions he had interpreted as stubbornness were really about the seller's fear of losing control over something he had spent decades building. The seller discovered that provisions he considered unnecessarily aggressive weren't necessarily coming from the buyer at all. Some were simply responses to financing requirements and risks uncovered during diligence. They didn't negotiate a single major term over dinner, and neither walked away with a concession. What they gained was more valuable: context. When negotiations resumed, the documents hadn't changed, but the way they read them had. Instead of assuming bad intent, they picked up the phone when something didn't make sense. Issues that previously generated long email chains were resolved in short conversations, and the transaction began moving again.
The Dinner That Saved The Deal
1-30 of 125
powered by
Acquisition Operator Network
skool.com/acquisition-operator-network-6250
Learn the craft of buying profitable businesses through real deal breakdowns, acquisition frameworks, and operator thinking.
Build your own community
Bring people together around your passion and get paid.
Powered by